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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how banks and other lending
institutions approach environmental risk management -- how they evaluate, screen and
provide for environmental risks in loan structuring and documenting loans. The intent of
this investigation is to identify and assess differences in lending policies, practices, and
pricing techniques among various lending institutions. This thesis will also examine how,
via their lending policies and practices, lenders can encourage sustainable
development, brownfield redevelopment, and ecologically responsible technologies in
property development.
This thesis proposes that there are three fundamental types of environmental
risk. The first type is the actual or perceived contamination of the property that directly
impairs the underlying asset value. This is the most easily understood type of
environmental risk and can be assessed during the due diligence period before the
transaction of the property.
After contamination, the second risk affecting collateral value may occur from
subsequent restrictions on property use, or in the processes or materials employed by
the business operating on the property. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
can impose deed or other restrictions on the use of a property because of potential
environmental contamination or other environmental hazards. Such limitations against
the "highest and best use" could substantially diminish the potential revenue of a
property and consequentially commercial property values. In this scenario, the real
asset is unaffected, but a company's credit worthiness may suffer.
The third type of environmental risk to a business is a possible change in
consumer preferences or demands for eco-friendly products. In an extreme case,
consumers could boycott environmentally damaging products, or possibly the firms that
manufacture them. Again, losses in revenue may constrain a company's ability to
satisfy loan payments.
This thesis seeks to investigate how the three forms of environmental risk are
factored into loan pricing and how banks evaluate information regarding environmental
policies and consumer demands when determining corporate revenues and property
values. In addition, the paper will study some of the lending institutions' due diligence
and loan evaluation procedures when assessing these environmental risks.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence S. Bacow
Title: Lee and Geraldine Martin
Professor of Environmental Studies
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Chapter 1:
The Nature of Environmental Risks and Sustainable Development
Introduction
Public environmental awareness and ecological responsibility have become
important considerations in today's real estate development and lending activity.
Particularly from a lender's point of view, there are not only the conventional credit and
legal aspects for banks to consider, but also environmental risks with adverse
consequences to both borrowers and lenders. Therefore, the management of
environmental risk is integral to the soundness and profitability of a lending institution's
loan portfolio.
The inability to rent or operate a commercial facility deprives the owner of income
and jeopardizes repayment of the loan. Furthermore, mitigating environmental risk is
not just limited to site cleanup costs, but can also involve government penalties and
awards to injured third parties. Given the current litigious climate, the conventional
wisdom for companies threatened with environmental lawsuits is to settle matters
quickly rather than to mount protracted legal battles'.
The overarching authority defining the impact of environmental risk on real estate
lending is Superfund-the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (see Chapter 2)2. Beyond compliance with the law, one could also
expect that lending institutions would pay particular attention to environmental risks,
1 Hopkinson, Natalie. "Honda, Ford to Pay Nearly $25 Million in Emissions Case," The Wall Street
Journal, vol. CCXXXI, no.111, 9 June 1998, p. B13.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) is more
commonly referred to as Superfund.
which can affect a borrower's cash flow and underlying collateral value, the fundamental
elements in loan underwriting and structuring.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how banks and other lending
institutions approach environmental risk management -- how they screen, evaluate, and
provide for environmental risks in structuring and documenting loans. The intent of this
investigation is to identify and assess differences in lending policies and practices
among various lending institutions in making and administering real estate loans. This
thesis will also examine how, via their lending policies and practices, lenders can
encourage sustainable development, brownfield redevelopment, and deployment of
ecologically responsible technologies in property development and use.
Broadly defined, sustainable development can be characterized as a real estate
development policy that incorporates ecological preservation and environmental
enhancement along with the conventional components that measure economic growth.
For example, the Gross Domestic Product measurement of national economic output
does not consider social utility (or disutility) and ecological externalities in determining a
country's wealth. Thus, irreplaceable natural resources consumed for economic
production are considered only as a one-time positive payoff. Destructive externalities,
such as deforestation, pollution, and soil contamination that produce latent, future
liabilities, are largely ignored. The social cost of brownfields and pollution is enormous;
they contribute to the esthetic and economic blight of urban and industrial areas,
thereby diminishing employment opportunities, eroding the tax base, and reducing the
value of adjacent properties. At the micro-economic level, clean technologies that
produce less pollution and hazardous byproducts and consume fewer natural resources
are often judged to be more risky than conventional, high environmental-cost
manufacturing techniques. Nevertheless, many companies have found it profitable to
pursue a strategy of waste minimization and have experienced short payback periods
on investments in waste management.3
There are many potential advantages for lenders, debtors, and society if lending
institutions establish progressive environmental policies that promote sustainable
development and mitigate financial risk exposure. Later in this chapter, this paper
defines three basic forms of environmental risks and explains their importance in loan
evaluation. Then the paper further examines several assumptions regarding how
lending institutions address these categories of risk in their lending policies.
"Chapter 2, History of Superfund and the Rise Federal Agency Guidelines,"
begins with the history of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) legislation and its impact on lender liability. Chapter 2 then
examines the environmental guidelines proposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and by the Federal Reserve Board for banks to incorporate in their
own internal lending policies to protect themselves from environmental liability.
"Chapter 3, How Currently Banks Underwrite Environmental Risk," describes how
banks are actually underwriting environmental risks and compares these practices to
the original assumptions. This investigation includes three different types of lending
institutions:
* Small, local banks with assets less than $1 billion which deal mostly with commercial
loans to retail customers within a few surrounding communities;
3 Blowers, Andrew and Pieter Glasbergen. Environmental Policy in an International Context: Prospects
for Environmental Change. (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1996), p. 59.
" Mid-sized, regional banks with assets over $1 billion, which specialize in home
mortgages and commercial lending and serve a wider regional area; and
e Large national financial institutions with more than $10 billion in assets, in which
commercial, corporate, and mortgage lending is only part of their broad lending and
financing services.
"Green banks" -- lending institutions in which sustainable development lending is a
substantial core competency -- are not considered in this study.
"Chapter 4, Looking Forward," summarizes what was learned, formulates
conclusions, and makes recommendations. This paper develops the position that
lending organizations could better understand both the opportunity and risk inherent in
environmental issues and could assume a greater role in promoting sustainable
development as a profitable segment of their real estate portfolios.
There are many advantages for lending institutions to take a pro-active approach
to evaluating environmental factors as a positive contribution to the value and credit
worthiness of a property. Clean technologies frequently pay for themselves in the long
run through savings on factory inputs and waste management costs. For example,
waste disposal expenses can be burdensome on an operating basis even without the
potential treble damages liability associated with improper disposal of hazardous
substances. Clean technology capital investments may not only stabilize future cash
flows by lowering operational costs, but may also add to a firm's competitive
advantage.4
Lenders should also appreciate the relationship between effective environmental
management and low borrower default risk. There is a strong correlation between a
4Schmidheiny, Stephan, et. al. Financing Chanae. (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 42.
firm's environmental management practices and its overall financial performance5 . As
an element of value enhancement, effective environmental risk management is
indicative of a company's overall ability to sustain profits. This is not surprising,
considering that today's best and brightest young managers tend to gravitate toward
clean companies. Beyond career enhancement, employees want to minimize their own
exposure to health hazards as well as contribute to a healthy environment.6 More
comprehensive environmental risk assessments by lenders combined with a borrower
who is an effective environmental risk manager adds to the profitability and stability of a
bank's real estate loan portfolio.
Brownfield developments - the reuse of previously contaminated properties - are
inevitably rising as both the scarcity of clean sites and the need for proximity increase
their desirability and value. As of 1997, over 500,000 acres of brownfield properties
were lying dormant.7 For manufacturing, distribution, and retailing companies for which
location is especially important, brownfields are a potential source of competitive
advantage.
Properly managed, brownfield and clean technology lending can add both to the
size and to the degree of certainty of a bank's loan portfolio. Besides, there are many
ancillary benefits to society if lending institutions were to make loans on previously
developed brownfields and on eco-friendly projects. More brownfield investment
translates into less greenfield consumption. Every time a lender turns down a loan for
5 Weber, Olaf. "Credit Management and Sustainable Development", article written for the workshop
entitled "Sustainable Industrial Development", October 1997, p. 10.6 Bennett, Steven J., ET. Al. Corporate Realities and Environmental Truths: Strategies for Leading Your
Business in the Environmental Era. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), p. 12.
7 Telego, Dean Jeffery. Opening Remarks for the conference on Risk-Based Decision-Making in
Successful Transactions and Brownfield Redevelopment." April 8-9 ,1998, p. 3.
brownfield development or clean technology improvement, the public loses the
opportunity for contamination remediation, cleaner air, and better public health.
Furthermore, as more contaminated sites are reclaimed, the public benefits from a
larger property tax base and more open space. Through more progressive
environmental assessment strategies, a lender can promote a more efficient flow of
private capital to fund environmentally important projects and technologies. This would
reduce the necessity for intervention by federal government, whose efforts to regulate
and redirect economic activity are often in conflict with the free market.8
Three Types of Environmental Risk Defined
Contamination Threats to Collateral Value
This thesis proposes that the first and most fundamental of relevant types of
environmental risk for lenders is the actual or perceived contamination of a property.
Contamination is the most basic and easily understood aspect of environmental risk
because the land and the rights and responsibilities of land ownership and use are
defined and controlled by the law9. Early in the loan application process, before major
transaction costs are incurred, such risks can be dimensioned as to the likelihood and
potential cost of remediation, using transaction screens, questionnaires, and Phase I
and Phase i assessments and audits. Uncertainty in assessing contamination stems
from the limited availability and reliability of information, self-serving disclosure
8 Blowers, p. 65.
9 Schmidheiny, p. 95.
statements, the uneven ability of Licensed Site Professionals (LSP's)'0 , and the
capabilities of the loan officers performing the transaction screen and loan assessment.
Beyond the impact of clean up of the collateral itself, collateral value can also be
adversely affected by the owner's liability for consequential damages to others. The
most significant environmental legislation defining such liability is the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA not
only establishes broad legal accountability for handling hazardous waste contamination
from past activities, it also defines responsibility for subsequent releases of hazardous
substances into the air, soil, and ground and surface water.
Superfund stipulates that the Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP's), as defined
by the Act, are liable for clean up costs plus any government fines and legal penalties
associated with the contamination. A lending institution can be designated as a PRP if
it participates in the operation or management of the borrower (or property), assumes
excessive control over the borrower (or property), or forecloses on the secured property
knowing that the site is contaminated. In such circumstances, foreclosure places a
lender between the rock of Superfund liability and the hard place of breach of fiduciary
responsibility. This lenders' dilemma seems not to have unduly bothered the drafters of
Superfund legislation.
Superfund imposes liability on past and present owners of the property as well as
lenders, regardless of fault. The federal government's rationale behind the law is to shift
clean up costs to private industry without regard to fairness." Not only do the past and
10 LSP's are qualified environmental engineers who can perform structured analysis, testing,
assessments, and audits for environmental compliance for both borrowers and properties1 Robb, Kathy E.B. and Renee R. Falzone. The Impact of Environmental Laws on Real Estate
Transactions. (New York: Hunton & Williams, 1990) pp. 94-95.
current responsible parties have to pay for damages, but faultless parties are also held
liable for clean up costs if they capture the economic benefits of remediation. In this
chain of successive joint-and-several liability, the government has a propensity for going
after the "deep pocket" entity, leaving that party to sue the others for their contribution.
Larger banks, unfortunately, are usually deemed to be the "deep pocket" entity.
Although CERCLA contains a "security interest exemption" that may exclude the lender
from the definition of an "owner or operator', the lender should take care in not
assuming too much control over its debtors, and it should take extra precaution on
foreclosing on blighted properties.
At the extreme, federal and state Superfund laws can decimate collateral value
by attaching a lien with priority status over all existing recorded liens on the property.
Such "Superliens" preempt all other subordinate security interests. With the secured
property so encumbered, the borrower can not transfer or sell the collateral.
Furthermore, Superfund can even attach the borrower's other uncontaminated real
properties and unrelated business assets, with devastating effects on the entire
enterprise. Even in bankruptcy proceedings, federal and state agencies have priority
status for environmental compliance.
Use Restrictions and Regulatory Risks to Borrower's Business Functions
After contamination, the second risk affecting collateral value can occur from
subsequent restrictions on property use or on the processes or materials employed by
the business operating on the property. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
can impose deed or other restrictions on the use of a property because of potential
environmental contamination or other environmental hazards. Such limitations against
the "highest and best use" can substantially diminish the potential revenue of a property
and consequentially commercial property values. The market value of a commercial
property is determined by Net Operating Income (NOI) divided by a Capitalization Rate
(cap rate) derived from current local real estate activity or industry multiplier. In addition,
the market value of a site cleaned up to pristine conditions can still be endangered if
nearby sites still contain hazardous substances. An intangible, though real, concern is
the lingering stigma of contamination that prevents landowners from charging market
rents on the property.
Another impediment to "highest and best use" can result from the enactment of
new environmental regulations and compliance requirements that adversely affect the
material input costs or operating costs of certain manufacturing processes. Such
restrictions include limitations on the use of certain materials or inputs that are
potentially toxic to people or the environment, reductions in the amount of effluent or
other emissions, and higher required levels of further remedial action. Subsequent
revisions to CERCLA regulations can require additional cleanup action even after
previous remediation standards have been satisfied. Extended remediation causes
operating disruptions and can stretch a borrower's financial resources and severely
constrain its ability to keep the loan current. Environmental compliance and restrictive
waste management permits can become so onerous that the borrower can not generate
enough revenue to both service the loan and continue operations. Credit instability is
exacerbated when operating and process compliance requires large capital outlays that
often necessitates additional loans. The resulting decreases in NOI can jeopardize the
collateral value even though the real asset has not been physically damaged.
Adding to the complexity of regulatory restrictions on property use risk is the
number of state and federal environmental agencies that have the authority to impose
different constraints on a company or property. These diverse agencies have their
individual mandates that reflect their own statutory environmental responsibilities,
without regard to consistency or to the fiduciary responsibilities of the lender. Through
the manipulation of the taxation and monetary systems and its legislative power, the
federal government has an overarching ability -though not always direct -- to divert
economic activity away from highly polluting industries.12
Consumer Preferences as Environmental Risk
The third form of environmental risk arises from the adverse consequences of
"green consumerism" and environmental activism on the reputation and market strength
of businesses. Consumer and investor preferences have shifted toward environmental
friendliness and ecological balance. Companies, products, and projects (including
development and land use projects) that are considered to be environmentally harmful
or insensitive are exposed to public opposition and retaliation. As more consumers
become environmentally concerned, businesses with poor environmental records can
face diminishing revenues. In an extreme case, boycotts and the ensuing bad press
could create a hostile business climate, severely curtailing the borrower's ability to
perform business activity on an ongoing basis. To an active environmentalist, such
12 Blowers, p. 65.
boycotts are not an attack on a business; rather, it is the firm's ecological
destructiveness that is an attack on itself."
Hypotheses of Current Bank Practices
Before conducting formal research, this paper formed several hypotheses
regarding how banks evaluate and assess environmental risk. The first premise is that
banks focus on possible contamination, the most basic environmental risk to the
collateral value, and largely ignore impaired use and negative consumer preferences as
environmental risks that could adversely impact a borrower's cash flows. Banking
organizations are more focused on investigating the presence of hazardous substances
and on the assessment of adverse effect on collateral value. This focus reflects both a
concern for the viability of the loan and the lender's looking to the property as the first
form of collateral in case of default. Therefore, banks would want to determine to the
highest degree of certainty the presence and extent of contamination.
The second assumption regarding bank lending practices is that institutions, in
an effort to limit their liability, would be extremely averse to providing loans on
properties with any sort of environmental stigma. This assumption is partially
substantiated by a 1991 survey by the American Banker's Association. This study of
small banks and Savings and Loan lenders discovered that 62.5% of the respondent
banks had rejected loan applications because of the potential for environmental liability.
The survey also found that 45.8% of these banks were discontinuing doing business
13 Jenner, Paul. The Environmental Business Handbook, First edition. (Trowbridge, England:
EUROMONITOR, 1989), p. 165.
altogether in high environmental risk industries such as petro-chemical companies and
dry cleaners.4
Further support of this avoidance assumption is provided by a later survey
conducted in 1996. Of 159 banks surveyed, 145 stated that they had refused, at least
once, to grant a loan because of the fear of Superfund liability. Fifteen respondents had
received letters from the EPA notifying them that they were Potentially Responsible
Parties (PRP's) under CERCLA. Of this group, twelve were forced to pay remediative
action costs and penalties. In addition, seven others were sued in private, third party
lawsuits.15 It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that "environmental redlining" is a
characterizing practice of commercial real estate lenders.
The final assumption on bank lending practices is that, when underwriting loans,
banks use traditional asset-based, loan structuring methodologies and do not have a
pricing strategy that specifically reflects the environmental credit risk. Bank risk
management decisions are dominated by their perceived fiduciary duty to minimize risk
and preserve capital.' Prudence rather than pricing prevails when environmental and
other social risk factors affect lending decisions. This notion of prudence originated
from a Massachusetts court ruling in 1830 and later became known as the "Prudent
Man Rule":
All that can be required of a trustee to invest is that he shall conduct himself
faithfully and exercise sound decision. He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to permanent disposition of their funds, considering probable
income, as well as probable safety of capital to be invested.17
14 Schmidheiny, p. 104.
15 Dennison, Mark. "Environmental Due Diligence Means Risk-Based Lending Vigilance," The Bankers
Maaazine. July/August 1996, p. 3.
Schmidheiny, p. 82.
17 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
This prudent lending approach, which enshrines precedent and generally accepted
practices, remains prevalent in today's banking organizations. Therefore, this paper
assumes that lenders treat environmental risk as a form of credit risk to be avoided
rather than to be mitigated through higher rates or other loan fees.
Description of Research
The purpose of this research is to better understand how lending institutions
evaluate environmental risks and to the role of bank lending decisions in advancing the
cause of sustainable development. This paper structures the analysis of environmental
risks by dividing the lending process into three stages: Loan Origination, Loan
Structuring and Pricing, and Loan Administration.
Loan Origination is the first stage, involves the initial process of making the loan
and includes transaction screens, disclosure statements, due diligence, and credit
review (the "five C's"- Cash flow, Collateral, Character, Capacity, and Compliance
Conditions)18 . Inter alia, due diligence addresses the environmental considerations
affecting both the economics of the loan as well as the underlying collateral.
Once the loan origination reviews have been compiled, the second phase of the
loan process is Loan Structuring and Pricing. Once all relevant risks, including
environmental risks, are evaluated to a reasonable degree and the bank is comfortable
making the loan, it then structures and prices the loan commenaurate with the credit,
default, and interest rate risks involved. Financial parameters--rates, terms, Loan-to-
Value ratios, and Debt Service Coverage ratios--are established. Appropriate protection
language covering indemnities, insurance, holdbacks, representations and warranties,
covenants, and protection of collateral is incorporated in the loan documentation.
The final phase of the loan process is the continuing Loan Administration during
the life of the loan. Beyond the routine collection and application of payments and
collateral administration, the need may arise for interest rate resets, term renegotiations,
refinancing, extensions, workouts, and foreclosure. Throughout the life of the loan,
periodic assessments and monitoring of the borrower and the property help ensure
compliance with loan covenants and other agreements. In addition, appropriate review
of the property's use and condition regarding risk and compliance should be performed.
Our research included interviews with senior lending officers and environmental
risk managers from several types of banks and with outside environmental attorneys.
These interviews provided information about the lending policies of banking
organizations during each of the three stages of the loan process as well as insight into
how banks consider and assess environmental risks. 19
Secondary research included both published material and lenders' internal
documents. Published materials included environmental articles and presentations
prepared for conventions on environmental issues and lending practices, as well as
books and papers regarding sustainable development. Annual reports from banking
organizations provided information regarding the size of their loan portfolios and the
types of services provided by these institutions to their targeted borrowers. Bank and
Telego, Dean Jeffery. "Banking on Brownfields: Financing the Reuse of Contaminated Commercial
and Industrial Sites", Presented to the conference on Risk-Based Decision-Making in Successful
Transactions and Brownfield Redevelopment." April 8-9 ,1988, page 5.
The bibliography contains a list of companies interviewed for this paper. The interviewees are treated
with confidentiality. The composite results of these interviews are reported throughout this thesis without
specific attribution.
Chapter 2:
History of Superfund and the Rise of Federal Agency Guidelines
Origins of Superfund and the Federal Agency Guidelines
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation Liability Act was
enacted in December of 1980 in response to the growing problem of improper handling
and disposal of hazardous substances. Superfund was enacted in the aftermath of the
Love Canal in the late 70's. The original $1.6 billion fund is in part replenished from
federal funds and tax revenues, but also from litigation settlements and recovery of fines
from responsible parties. Currently General Accounting Office estimates that there are
450,000 brownfields in the United States.' As amended, the Superfund legislation
empowers the EPA to identify and clean up hazardous waste sites and contaminated
properties and then look to the potentially responsible parties for reimbursement.2
The Superfund has revolutionized the evaluation and management of
environmental risks associated with real estate transactions and has brought such
matters to the forefront of established lending practice. Although enacted in 1980, the
consequences of CERCLA took several years to be fully appreciated by lenders. It was
only after a series of Superfund rulings against lending institutions that lenders began to
pay attention to environmental factors. The federal government pursues a policy of
shifting the burden of cleanup costs to private parties, regardless of fault. The potential
IKimball, David. "Opportunities Abound, But Don't Expect to Bottom-Fish Your Way to Profitability,"
Development, vol. XXIX, no. 1, spring 1998, p. 9.
2 Olexa, Michael T. "Contaminated Collateral and Lender Liability, CERCLA, and the New Age Banker,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 73, no. 5, December 1991, p. 1388.
exposure to liability on the part of relatively innocent lenders is the perhaps the most
astonishing aspect of CERCLA.3
Superfund defines which entities are subject to liability for the clean up costs of
hazardous substance contamination. These include "the owner and operator of a
vessel or facility", or any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
"owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of".
There are four liability standards that the banking organization should be
concerned with under CERCLA:
1. Strict Liability: This standard applies regardless of whether intent or prior knowledge
of the situation was present and is subject only to very narrow legal defenses. The
statue of strict liability means that the Government does not have to prove the
owners or operators had knowledge of, or caused the contamination.
2. Joint-and-Several Liability: Each party involved with the property may be
responsible for the total cleanup costs or damages, even when other parties are
known to have contributed to the problem. This allows the Government to seek
recovery of the entire cost of the clean up from any individual party that is deemed
liable and has "deep pockets."
3. Retroactive Liability: A property owner can be responsible for actions occurring
many years prior to the passage of the law, regardless of whether their previous
actions were the standard practice of the time or had received regulatory agency
approval.
4. Unending Liability: Liability for a problem occurring during ownership on a site does
not end with the transfer of property, but extends as long as the problem remains.4
As the result of several lawsuits beginning in the middle 1980's against lenders,
some lenders initiated their own environmental risk management policies. Perhaps the
most influential case for lending activity to emerge out of Superfund litigation is the
3 Nanney, Donald C. Environmental Risks in Real Estate Transactions: A Practical Guide, Second
edition. (New York: Executive Enterprises Publications Co., Inc., McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 4.
United States vs. Fleet Factors filed in 1990, which argued that a lender's mere capacity
to influence a borrower's decisions could trigger the "participation in management"
clause under CERCLA.5 If interpreted strictly, this clause could have had a devastating
effect on lending activity. For example, a lender extending credit to a borrower could
expose itself to unlimited liability due to the acts of the borrower. In response, the EPA
in April of 1992 promulgated the "security interest exemption" and the "involuntary
acquisition" element of the innocent landowner defense. This ruling became known as
the EPA Lender Liability Rule6 and clarified that actual [emphasis added] control by a
lender is necessary to constitute "participation in management".
However, the ruling sets forth two conditions in which the lender could be still
held liable for environmental liability under CERCLA. First, a bank remains liable if it
directs the borrower's environmental compliance decisions. Such direction would
include the bank's recommending the use of an LSP who was negligent in performing a
Phase I or 11 site assessment or audit. It would also include the lender making decisions
regarding remedial action and waste disposal. The second exposure to loss of the
security interest exemption occurs if the lender controls the overall management of the
buyer with respect to environmental compliance, or takes part in a significant portion of
the business' daily operations. The lender can also lose the security interest exemption
if it assumes an active role in forming a Phase IlIl remediation program. A Phase Ill
4 FDIC, Division of Depositor and Asset Services. Environmental Guidelines Manual. October 1997,
appendix B2-3.
5 Ibid., p. 2
6 Ibid.
plan is defined as a remediation or clean up of an environmental contamination problem
and requires agency approval before it can be implemented.7
The Fleet Factors case raised the possibility that a banking organization could
incur environmental liability just by granting a loan to a borrower regardless of prior
knowledge of contamination. According to many of the interviewees, this case caused
much anxiety through out the lending community. Prior to the 1992 clarification, the
Federal Reserve Board issued its environmental policy guidelines entitled
"Environmental Liability" (SR 19-20), which will be discussed later in the next section of
this chapter. The guidelines were partially motivated by the Fleet Factors case and
partially by the fact that both the federal government and FDIC-insured banks were
holding many foreclosed properties with environmental problems. These foreclosures
where caused by the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980's combined with the
economic recession of the early 1990's.
From the mid-1 980's and up to the Fleet Factors case in 1990, court decisions
were severely interpreting how banking organizations were participating as operators in
contaminated properties and therefore liable under CERCLA. This prompted the
Federal Reserve Board to help nationally chartered banks in forming safeguards against
environmental liability. The Federal Reserve guidelines primarily focus on the
responsibilities and risks associated with contamination pursuant to the Superfund
statue. The intent of these guidelines is to "identify and minimize potential
7 Parks, David C. Environmental Management for Real Estate Professionals. (Institute of Real Estate
Management of the National Association of Realtors, 1992), p. 66.
environmental liability" for the banking organizations.8 The Federal Reserve Board is
the controlling body of the nation's monetary system, and part of its responsibilities is to
"contribute to financial stability and better economic performance by limiting the scope
of financial disruptions and preventing their spread outside the financial sector."9
Therefore it has the authority to maintain the integrity and solvency of the banking
system, specifically nationally chartered banks.
The Federal Reserve is partially concerned with situations in which lending
institutions could be held directly and solely responsible for remediation costs as well as
the legal liability of a PRP. These penalties can be severe. In addition to remedial
action costs (including interest) incurred by the Government or state , a PRP may be
required to pay up to $50,000,000 for natural resource damages, plus civil penalties of
$25,000 per violation. The civil penalties can be assessed for every day of on-going
non-compliance.10 The other issue that the guidelines address is the more common
situation where lenders abandon their claims to the security because remediation costs
and/or potential environmental liability costs exceed the balances owed by the debtor.
In February of 1993, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued
"Guidelines for an Environmental Risk Program" (FIL-14-93) directed at the chief
executive officers of FDIC-supervised commercial and savings banks. The guidelines
were intended to provide an overview of environmental risks and offer some
recommendations about establishing an environmental risk program tailored to the
8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Environmental Liability" (SR 91-20), 11 October
1991, p. 4.
9 Federal Reserve Board Internet site, "Goals of the Monetary Policy."
10 Nanney, p. 5.
lending activities of the lending institution and its various branches. The FDIC
guidelines will be discussed later on in this chapter. The motivation behind the
guidelines overlaps the concerns of the Federal Reserve Board and the guidelines
address similar issues. However, as the insurer of depositors' accounts, the FDIC has
fundamental responsibility for a member banking organization's solvency:
Institutions need to implement an environmental risk program in order to evaluate
the potential adverse effect of environmental contamination on the value of real
property and potential environmental liability associated with the real property.
The failure of an institution to evaluate potential environmental risks associated
with real property may contribute to an institution's inability to collect on its loans
and affect the institution's financial condition."
Both the Federal Reserve guidelines and the FDIC guidelines address
environmental risk as a form of credit risk affecting the borrower, and not necessarily
limited to the secured property itself. For example, a borrower may be forced to pay
remediation costs for a property unrelated to a loan with a particular institution. Even
though the bank's collateral is intact, onerous clean up costs on another site may
threaten the debtor's capacity to satisfy debt payments. In addition, first priority
Superliens can be attached to all the borrower's property and assets. An example
would be an instance where a loan is made to a borrower to fund operations or
manufacturing equipment. If the borrower is later held responsible for cleaning up
hazardous materials, the burden of remediation could threaten its solvency and
jeopardize the bank's collection on an outstanding loan. The Federal Reserve
guidelines also point out the environmental risks which can be borne or caused by
11 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "Guidelines for an Environmental Risk Program " (FIL-1 4-93),
25 February 1993, p. 2.
parent corporations and subsidiaries or by successor companies of irresponsible
businesses. Furthermore, courts have ruled that the corporate veil does not necessarily
protect companies as it pertains to environmental liability.12
Federal Reserve Board Environmental Liability Guidelines
Summary of the Environmental Policies and Procedures
According to the Federal Reserve Board, loan policies and procedures should
address methods for identifying potential environmental problems relating to new loans
as well as to existing loans in the bank's portfolio. Throughout the loan cycle, the bank's
loan policy should require due diligence in proportion to the degree of credit risk. In
other words, borrowers in high-risk industries or localities require a more stringent
investigation than relatively low risk entities. Banks should also develop standard
operating procedures for portfolio analysis, credit monitoring, workouts, and
foreclosures. Whatever established management program they implement, banks
should take extra precautions that their environmental risk management activity does
not constitute "participation in management" according to Superfund interpretations. 13
The guidelines went on to describe six basic steps to avoid, or at least mitigate,
environmental liability. It should be noted that these guidelines were intended to be
general. Their abstraction is meant to provide flexibility for banking organizations when
banks customized their own institutional policies and procedures to accommodate their
individual lending activities and risk tolerances. The guidelines provided an overview of
12 Robb, Kathy E.B. and Renee R. Falzone. The Impact of Environmental Laws on Real Estate.
Transactions. (New York: Hunton & Williams, 1990) p. 66
13 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, p. 2.
environmental hazards as they relate to credit risks, but primarily focused on the
screening and testing of the site and adjacent properties. The Federal Reserve
guidelines failed to offer substantive advice on how to determine a comprehensive risk
tolerance nor did they proscribe specific training for bank personnel. This paper
organizes and explains the six recommendations according to the Loan Origination,
Loan Structure and Pricing, and Loan Administration model set forth in Chapter 1.
Loan Origination
First, the Federal Reserve guidelines suggested that lending institutions should
adopt documented practices to conduct an appropriate analysis of the property offered
as collateral. The guidelines recommended that as the level of environmental risk rises,
the more rigorous the investigation should be.14 The following are three prescribed
types of analyses and procedures that the guidelines proposed should be incrementally
undertaken as the level of environmental liability increases:
1. Environmental review: The screening of the borrower's activities should be
performed by the bank's own personnel or by real estate appraisers using
questionnaires, interviews, and walk-throughs. The site's prior uses as well as the
adjacent properties should be reviewed.
2. Phase I Environmental Assessment: A structured analysis by qualified individual
should be done to identify a borrower's past practices, regulatory compliance, and
potential future problems. EPA records should also be checked.
3. Phase 11 Environmental Audit: A professional engineer or licensed site professional
performs more comprehensive testing of soil and air samples if the Phase I
assessment suggest further testing is warranted. 15
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., pp. 2-3
Secondly, the guidelines encouraged banks to develop record-keeping
procedures and checklists to document the due diligence efforts taken at the time of
origination, or prior to acquiring foreclosed collateral. Most banks cite using slightly
modified ASTM transaction screens for their initial environmental review. The ASTM
transaction screens will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, How Banks Currently
Manage Environmental Risks. As a standard operating procedure, all of the banks
interviewed have the borrower perform the Phase I site assessment. Additional testing
is done only if environmental conditions warrant it.
Loan Structuring and Pricing
This third stage of the loan process is the least defined. The guidelines advised
that banking organizations should include warranties, representations and
indemnifications in loan agreements. These should be designed to protect the lender
from losses stemming from hazardous substance contamination. Virtually all of the
banks that make loans with environmental issues go beyond this suggestion and also
include covenants that require borrowers to comply with all applicable environmental
laws. How banks underwrite environmental risk will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
Loan Administration
The fourth step a banking organization should undertake is to prepare an
environmental policy statement and to provide training programs for lending staff in
order to protect itself from financial losses due to environmental causes. Towards this
end, most lending institutions provide their staff with seminars on environmental risks
and legislation. Banks also encourage personnel to participate in forums on current
environmental issues. Many banks' General Policy Manuals contain an Environmental
Risk Management section that contains environmental terms, regulations, and liabilities
as they pertain to borrower credit risk or collateral value. The Environmental Risk
Management policy usually states the environmental program's objectives and
frequently has an admonishment against participating in borrower activities.
After an environmental policy has been approved, the bank is encouraged to
create a position or department responsible for environmental risk management policy.
The functions of this unit should include setting risk policy, establishing loan evaluation
and monitoring procedures, reviewing individual loans and recommending suitable
structures, and overseeing compliance with risk policies for new and existing loans.
The sixth and final recommendation involves setting up an oversight procedure
for reviewing existing loans in order to detect potential environmental problems early.
The quality of diligence varies widely among banks. This paper will discuss the
differences in loan review practices in more detail in the FDIC section in this chapter.
FDIC Guidelines for an Environmental Risk Program
Summary of the Environmental Risk Program
The FDIC proposed that, as part of the institution's overall decision making
process, the environmental risk program should establish procedures for identifying and
evaluation potential environmental concerns associated with lending practices and other
actions relating to real property.16 The board of directors should review and approve
the program and designate a senior officer knowledgeable in environmental matters
responsible for program implementation. The environmental risk program should be
tailored to the needs of the lending institution. Institutions that have a heavier
concentration of loans to higher risk industries or localities of known contamination may
require a more elaborate and sophisticated environmental risk program than institutions
that lend more to lower risk industries or localities.
The FDIC guidelines also prescribed staff training, environmental policy
guidelines and procedures, environmental reviews or analyses during the application
process, loan documentation standards, and appropriate environmental risk
assessment safeguards in the event of loan workout situations or foreclosures. The
following section outlines and summarizes the components of the FDIC guidelines along
the lines of the 3-stage loan process model.
Loan Origination
Environmental Risk Analysis: Initial environmental risk analysis needs to be conducted
during the application process. This review allows the lending institution to prevent or
minimize the environmental risk exposure that may result in potential losses. The loan
officer should gather as much information as possible concerning the loan applicant's
business activities. Interviews and inquiries about the site's past and present uses
should be conducted. A physical inspection of the property should be done to verify that
there is no obvious visual evidence of environmental damage.
16 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, p. 3.
Based on the interviews, banks use either ASTM transaction screens or a
customized version of them when performing the initial stages of due diligence. The
ASTM model, described in Chapter 3, addresses most of the environmental issues
associated with real property.17
Structured Environmental Risk Assessment: Whenever an environmental issue
becomes evident, a qualified consultant should perform a more extensive analysis.
Also, a review of public records should include contact with federal and state
environmental protection agencies to determine whether the site or loan applicant has
been censured for environmental contamination or for violations concerning
environmental laws.
This investigation learned that Phase I site assessments are performed as a
matter of course during due diligence. Even small banks that do not have an
environmental policy or knowledge of the FDIC's guidelines require them as part of the
loan application. If a Phase 11 audit determines that the complexity of the problem is
beyond the staffs level of experience, the bank will hire outside consultants and legal
experts.
The larger banks perform compliance audits and emission permits to ascertain a
level of risk for borrowers in high-risk industries. If pollution permits are restrictive and
the borrower's environmental history is poor, the lending institution will most likely
redline the loan.
17 Ibid.
Loan Structuring and Pricing
Loan Documentation: Loan documents should include language to safeguard the
institution against potential environmental liability and losses. Such language might
require that the borrower complies with environmental laws, disclose information about
the environmental status of the real property collateral, and grant the institution the right
to acquire additional information about potential hazardous contamination by inspecting
the property for environmental concerns. The loan documents might also provide that
the bank has a right to call the loan, refuse to extend funds under a line of credit, or
foreclose if hazardous contamination is discovered in the real property collateral. The
loan documents might also call for an indemnity of the institution by the borrower or
guarantors for environmental liability.
Most of the larger banks employ rigorous loan underwriting techniques. Almost
all of them in our survey incorporate holdbacks and escrows as protection against
excessive remediation costs. In addition, they include covenants that address the
obligations of the borrower for remediative action or environmental compliance issues.
All borrowers, regardless of the presence of contamination or environmental issues, are
required to indemnify the lender for any and all environmental liabilities that stem from
the property.
Loan Administration
Policies: Loan policies, manuals and procedures should include environmental issues
and liabilities that reflect the banking organization's lending activities. In addition,
procedures for the resolution of environmental concerns, credit risk monitoring,
workouts, and foreclosures should also be established.
In practice various banking organizations and branches do customize their
policies and procedures to reflect their risk tolerances and lending activities.
Furthermore, different lending departments can have slight variations in their lending
policies. For example, corporate lending departments do not address remediation
issues as diligently as commercial lending departments. Regardless of lending activity
or bank size, all of the banks' program objectives pledge to avoid engaging in borrower
activities which may result in environmental liability and to comply with all environmental
laws.
Monitoring: The environmental risk assessment should continue during the life of the
loan by monitoring the borrower and the real property collateral for potential
environmental problems. The institution should also be aware of changes in the
business activities of the borrower that result in a significant increased risk to the
collateral. If there is a potential for the environmental contamination to adversely affect
the value of the property, the institution might exercise its rights under the loan to
require the borrower to resolve the condition and to take actions that are reasonably
necessary to protect the value of the real property.
This paper discovered that there is no uniform practice among banks in
monitoring loans. Different lending institutions have very distinct levels of attentiveness
for following loans. These different monitoring strategies have nothing to do with the
size of the bank. Some banks periodically check on the collateral or borrower's
practices only if is in a high-risk category. Other banks have no policy for regularly
supervising loans. One bank in this study employs a tiered strategy for monitoring
loans. High-risk loans are monitored at least once a year while medium-risk loans are
checked every two or three years. Low-risk loans are monitored on three-year cycles.
Involvement in the Borrower's Operations: Under Superfund, the institution may have an
exemption from environmental liability as the holder of a security interest in the real
property collateral. In monitoring a loan for potential environmental concerns, and
resolving those environmental situations as necessary, the institution should evaluate
whether its actions may constitute the "participation in management" of the business
located on the property within the meaning and intention of CERCLA.
Foreclosure: A lender's exposure to environmental liability may increase significantly if
it takes title to real property held as collateral. The institution should evaluate the
potential environmental costs and liability in conjunction with an assessment of the
value of the collateral in reaching a decision to take title to the property by foreclosure or
other means.
All of the banks in the study perform due diligence whenever the security of the
collateral may potentially be threatened.
Training: The environmental risk program should incorporate sufficient training in order
to effectively implement and follow the environmental risk program within the
organization. Personnel should have adequate knowledge and experience to determine
and evaluate environmental concerns. If the complexity of the environmental issue is
beyond the expertise of the institution's staff, the institution should seek outside
consultation with the appropriate qualifications.
Investigation discovered that lending institutions have capable upper level
environmental staff. Many of the senior Environmental Risk Managers that were
interviewed had some sort of legal training or experience. Other ERM's had been
consultants working for environmental engineers or licensed site professionals. In
addition to creating and revising the bank's environmental policies, the ERM's are also
responsible for training lending staff about environmental issues. Environmental
managers instruct loan officers to have general knowledge and awareness of the issues
and liabilities associated with real estate and manufacturing.
Supervisory Policy: Examiners will review an institution's environmental risk program as
part of the examination of its lending and investment activities. When analyzing
individual credits, examiners will review the institution's compliance with its own
environmental risk program. Failure to establish or comply with an appropriate
environmental program will be criticized and corrective action required.
Although the FDIC guidelines are somewhat clearer than the Federal
Reserve Board's, there are still not very specific. The intent was to outline some of the
issues in general so that banking institutions can customize the guidelines to suit their
lending activity. Despite their vagueness, most of the lending institutions in this study
cite their influence in establishing their organizations' environmental risk management
polices.
In October of 1993, the FDIC's Division of Depositor and Asset Services (DAS)
developed a more specific set of guidelines based on the FDIC Guidelines for an
Environmental Risk Program. The manual was designed for Account Officers and
Environmental Coordinators to create effective, consistent, and cost efficient
environmental risk management which will reduce the possibility of diminished loan
recovery and environmental liability. It sets forth the minimum procedural requirements
to be followed when handling assets with environmental issues. It provides matrices
and checklists on how to perform inspections, interviews and disclosure statements,
monitoring, and foreclosure proceedings. It also provides information about important
federal and state environmental regulations, including CERCLA, as well as defining
some of the more important court rulings as they affect lending institutions.
Chapter 3:
How Banks Currently Underwrite Environmental Risk
Overview
This chapter describes how banks deal with environmental risks in the making of
real estate loans. With minor variations, banks employ similar organizational structures
and processes for originating, structuring, and administering their real estate loan
portfolios. Within these broad functions different sized banks are more or less
specialized in their treatment of the environmental risk aspects of loan making.
Differences in scale, geographic and borrower diversity and proximity-to-the-borrower
account for most of the differences in approaches among different lending institutions.
Of lesser importance, though still significant, are the lending histories and cultures of
individual institutions and the branches within them.
This discussion of lending practices is organized around the specific aspects of
risk management associated with each environmental threat to collateral value:
contamination, use and operational restrictions, and adverse consumer preferences.
Practices employed during each loan phase-Loan Origination, Loan Structuring and
Pricing, and Loan Administration-are described and characterized as to prevalence,
effectiveness, and potential impact on sustainable development.
The principal sources of research reported in this chapter include:
* general reading on the policies, operations, and practices of lending institutions for
underwriting loans; see especially Bank Lending Policies by Douglas A. Hayes
referenced in the bibliography. Other sources include sample Environmental Risk
Management Policies from environmental data consultants and the FDIC's Division
of Depositor and Asset Services (DAS) Environmental Guidelines Manual;
" structured interviews with senior lending officers, environmental risk managers,
accountants, and attorneys;' and
a unstructured discussions with borrowers, bankers, real estate lawyers, real estate
finance consultants, Licensed Site Professionals, bankers, and bank industry
consultants.
In general, opportunities for banks to make commercial and real estate loans
originate from the interactions between the bank's account officers and their customers.
In a corporate or commercial banking relationship, the need for a real estate loan will
usually arise in the context of the bank's overall credit relationship and history with the
borrower, who might also have a short-term credit line and other outstanding asset-
based loans. Although it could vary with the size and scope of the developer, a real
estate loan typically originates with a bank's branch-based loan gathering operation.2
The loan origination process for real estate loans is commonly handled by a
central headquarters department serving the entire bank, or in a national bank, a
geographic region. This department drives the origination process through the bank's
established procedures for qualifying the borrower, valuing the property and its
projected cash flows, and performing due diligence, including environmental risk
assessments. As described in more detail later in this chapter, larger banks will have
dedicated Environmental Risk Management (ERM) departments that participate in the
environmental assessment process. Depending on loan size, loan approval is required
I Due to the sensitive and proprietary nature of this subject, several of the representatives of the lending
institutions requested anonymity. Because the sample of interviewees is limited, many of the statements
are generalized in order to prevent statements from being attributed to a certain individual, lending
institution, or entity.
2 This general description on the organization of banks is based upon Bank Lending Policies by Douglas
A Hayes and Commercial Loan Analysis by Kenneth R. Pirok, as well as primary research on
environmental risk.
by one or more credit committees separate from both the account management and
loan processing departments. A credit committee has final decision-making authority,
and can recommend approval subject to revision of terms or other forms of credit
enhancement.
Working with the bank's internal or outside real estate counsel, the origination
department will structure the loan (i.e. set its basic financial provisions), sometimes
interacting with the credit committee. The various documents required to close the loan
are prepared by this group in negotiations with the borrower, the borrower's counsel,
and other consultants. Once the loan is closed and "booked", the bank's loan
administration department, usually one dedicated to real estate, takes over routine
processing and oversight functions.
Within this general framework, banks to a greater or lesser degree have
processes and personnel dedicated to the environmental component of loan making
and loan administration. The remainder of this chapter specifically addresses these
practices.
General Discussion
Within a broad overall framework, lenders employ their own individual
approaches for underwriting environmental risk. Each bank has its own risk tolerance,
depending on a variety of factors. Based upon the experiences of some real estate
finance consultants, larger banks are more comfortable in making loans with
environmental risks than smaller lenders. In general banks that have a longer history of
successful underwriting when environmental issues present are more likely to extend
credit. Conversely, if a bank had a bad experience with a borrower in a high-risk
industry or area, the bank would be less inclined to make a loan in similar
circumstances.
Large banks, defined here as those who have a national or international network
of branches, have multiple core businesses, and have assets over $10 billion, are more
structured in their lending procedures as they relate to environmental considerations.
They usually have large, well-trained environmental risk management departments,
organizations dedicated to managing environmental credit risk policies and for training
the bank's lending staff, credit officers, and loan administrators. These environmental
departments are, by design, organizationally separate from the departments that are
originating and underwriting individual loans
Although lending decisions may be distributed among corporate, commercial,
and mortgage lending departments and branch locations, there is usually one main
Environmental Services (ES) or Environmental Risk Management (ERM) Department.
Its primary purpose is to limit risk to the bank of losses due to the environmental
liabilities of its borrowers or arising from the bank's own activities in managing its real
estate loan portfolio. According to the loan officers of both national and regional lending
institutions, environmental risk and liability are treated as credit risk, and while loans
with environmental concerns are reported to and screened by the ERM department,
which acts in an advisory capacity with respect to environmental considerations.
Even though the ERM departments determine an institution's environmental
lending policy, there can be slight variations for individual departments and branches.
These differences may reflect a particular marketing objective, risk tolerance, a unique
location or industry served, or atypical loan patterns vis-a-vis the rest of the banking
organization. Therefore, a large lending institution requires an environmental policy that
is comprehensive enough to protect the institution and flexible enough to be
differentiated for the needs of various departments and branches. The ERM of a large
banking organization stated that if an individual department or branch wants to create its
own policy, it has to make a written request to the ERM department and the Board of
Directors. Both the ERM department and the board must agree that the request is
appropriate. It is seldom the case, however, for branches or departments petition for
individual policies.
Mid-sized lending institutions-those banking organizations, which serve a
diverse market and manage over $1 billion in assets--are often as well positioned as the
largest banks when it comes to underwriting environmental risks. Because they are
frequently more focused on certain industries in their geographies, they may be more
aggressive than large banks in providing loans on properties with environmental issues.
Besides competitive pressures and a more enterprising business style, there are
two good reasons for regional banks are willing to extend credit on contaminated or
potentially contaminated collateral. Regional banks usually have local branches close to
their corporate headquarters, which have fewer layers of management than the largest
banks. Thus, a local branch can originate a loan and have it reviewed by its ERM
department, and underwritten and documented relatively quickly. Another key
advantage is that middle sized banks have "local knowledge". They can be more
familiar with the local borrowers, conditions and histories and had prior experience with
certain environmental issues, or even properties in a given area. Familiarity provides a
form of "security" that has value to lenders. A local lender, who is both familiar with
potential problems and aware of the upside potential in a particular property, may be
quicker to grant a loan than a distant bank. According to environmental and financial
consultants, borrowers with tainted properties will most likely obtain financing from a
large, local bank for these reasons.
Proximity is also a benefit when monitoring a loan for environmental compliance.
Loan officers, administrators, and environmental risk managers are members of the
local community and its information network. They have ready access to their
properties for inspection, monitoring, and auditing remediative action. Having local
knowledge, combined with efficient corporate practices, allows regional banks to
respond quickly to unforeseen environmental problems or non-compliant borrowers.
As with the national banking institutions, the regional lender's ERM department
establishes the organization's general environmental lending policy. In theory, there
could be slight variations among the individual departments and branches that reflect
differences in risk tolerance, markets, or local lending needs. In practice, however, there
will be few differences among the branches within a single region.
Small banks have only a few branches in a relatively small area with a limited
range of commercial and/or home mortgage borrowers. In interviews and discussions
with bankers of small institutions, most admit to employing a binary decision process. If
the property is "clean", they will most likely extend credit, if other considerations are
satisfied. As a very general rule, if the loan application has any sort of environmental
issue associated with the borrower or collateral, the bank will decline granting the loan.3
3 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. If a borrower is a valued customer with a solid credit
history, and has assets above the costs of environmental liability, the bank will consider extending credit.
Small local banks do not have an Environmental Risk Manager or even an ERM policy.
Typically these banks will rely on outside consultants and legal counsel to review
environmental issues.
Despite the differences among banks in different categories, they share many
similarities. Most commonly, all senior personnel proclaim their commitment to prudent
lending practices. While they want to fund projects that promote the borrower's growth,
few banks have a sustainable development focus. Nor do many have a predilection to
promote social benefits in their lending policies. Driven by a disposition toward
prudence as defined by federal guidelines, environmental risk managers of both the
nationally chartered and regional banking organizations have adapted the FDIC
environmental guidelines to reflect their markets, profit goals, and risk tolerances.
Environmental risk management policies, framed by the FDIC guidelines, have
been established by Environmental Services or Environmental Risk Management
departments and approved by the banking organizations' Board of Directors. In addition
to creating, documenting, reviewing, and periodically updating the environmental risk
policy, the ERM departments are also typically responsible for training loan officers and
administrators in identifying and reporting environmental issues. Lending personnel are
trained through seminars and workshops and are provided with the lending institution's
loan policy manual, which includes materials specific to environmental risk. This
training is limited to general awareness of the applicable regulations, liabilities and
responsibilities of the lending institution, as outlined by the federal guideline, and not on
specific physical, business, or geographic factors that define the risk characteristics of a
property. The narrow focus of the training neither serves to sharpen risk assessment
skills nor to broaden officers' awareness of sustainable development opportunities.
Another similarity among banking organizations is how loans are reviewed,
structured, and monitored. Loans are evaluated on a case-by-case basis using the "five
C's" of credit risk management (Cash flow, Collateral, Character, Capacity, and
Compliance Conditions). Loans with associated environmental issues are priced the
same as "clean" loans that have no environmental stigma. However, loans with
potential environmental liability are structured more conservatively in regards to debt
service coverage ratios (DSCR's) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, and have more
stringent underwriting standards. How loans are priced and underwritten will be
described in more detail later in this chapter.
Environmental due diligence practices are also uniform among these types of
banking organizations. Transaction screens, disclosure statements, questionnaires,
and inquiries are based on the ASTM (American Society of Testing and Materials) site
transaction screen checklist, to be described in further detail later in this chapter. All
banks require a Phase I site assessment to determine if a problem exists on the
property. If a hazardous substance is discovered, a Phase i audit is performed to
identify the type of contamination and the extent of remediation to clean up the site.
Approaches for Evaluating Contamination Threats to Collateral Value
Loan Origination
As a critical part of the initial Origination Process, the first stage in evaluating
environmental risk is to determine if there is, in fact, contamination on the property and
the potential consequences of such contamination. This initial stage is termed due
diligence and consists of site inspections, and Phase I and il assessments and audits.
These inspections are performed using ASTM transaction screens developed in
1993. The ASTM screen is designed for a non-expert loan officer to identify quickly and
inexpensively any environmental problems and to determine if further investigation is
required. The ASTM checklist has become the standard for most lending institutions,
although some have modified it to suit the organization's lending activities, risk
sensitivities, and property types.
The ASTM transaction screen consists of four components:
* An environmental questionnaire and disclosure statement for the current property
owner. These are considered to have limited value by most loan officers and
environmental risk managers who perceive that the current owners may not always
be forthright when disclosing environmental problems.
* A walk-through and visual site inspection by a bank officer and Licensed Site
Professional. A physical inspection seeks to verify owner representations and to
conduct a checklist of potential problems to look for, such as the presence of
asbestos, dark spots in the soil, or other visual irregularities.
* A review of local and state environmental records for prior contamination of the site
or environmental mismanagement on the part of the prior owner and current loan
applicant; and,
* An historical review on the prior uses of the property. This may include inspecting
old fire insurance maps or checking with municipal fire department records.
Simultaneously with the above, the Phase I site assessment is performed by the
LSP who use both on-site and laboratory assessments to determine the nature of any
contamination. If contamination is found and identified, a Phase I site audit is executed
to determine the extent and source of contamination as well as the magnitude and cost
of the required clean up. When a property is contaminated, the loan officer generally
passes the loan application along to the environmental risk manager. The
environmental risk manager reviews the loan documents and, if not recommending that
it be declined, makes suggestions on how to structure the loan and what stipulations
should be included in the agreements to address the environmental issues.
This research discovered that loan officers do not increase the interest rates for
an environmentally risky loan, nor do they require more points up front. There are,
however, differences in how loans on contaminated properties are structured; these
differences will be discussed in the next section.
Loan Structuring and Pricing
All loans are typically priced on a loan to value ratio of 75% of the real estate
asset value.4 In the case of a brownfield loan, the asset value is based on the estimate
of the property value under pristine conditions minus the cost of remediation. Virtually
all of the ERM's and loan officers agree that the cost of remediation in relation to
property value is the most important factor banks consider when structuring a loan. As a
rule of thumb, the remediation-cost-to-value should never exceed 40%, and should
ideally be less than 25%. In addition, a 15-20% contingency allowance is made and
should be included in the holdback to compensate for any unforeseen cost overruns.5
The added cushion in the LTV ensures that the borrower has adequate equity in the
property. The additional equity also provides greater incentive for the borrower to take
further remediative action in order to hold on to the property.
4 Henry, Evan C. and Randy A Muller. "Private Sector Financing Considerations for Brownfields," Bank of
America Internet site, 0 1996.
The cash flow of a borrower is the primary source of repayment for a loan. For
this reason, cash flow analysis is one of the most important factors in determining
whether to make a loan as well as in ascertaining a loan's risk.6 As a strategy for
greater security against default and credit risk, many of the loan officers in this
investigation will offer lower debt service coverage ratios in loans with environmental
risk.
Indemnifications are standard components in all forms of collateralized loans.
Depending on circumstances, indemnities may be issued by the current property owner,
the borrower, a third party or affiliated guarantor, or the party responsible for the
property's contamination. The language of the indemnity sets forth the responsibility to
compensate the lender if it has to pay for any clean up activity. The value of an
indemnity is primarily measured by the financial resources of the indemnifying party.
Because of joint-and-several responsibilities and the unending liability under CERCLA,
indemnities must bind all relevant parties on an open-ended basis.
If a guarantor is sought, it has to be an entity separate from and unconnected to
the borrower to protect the bank in the event of borrower bankruptcy. If a third party can
not provide an indemnity, or if a guarantor is unwilling to expose itself to long-term
environmental risks, two forms of insurance are commonly used. "Post remediation"
coverage insures that, once remediative action has been completed, any further action
that may be required in the future will be paid by the insuring party. The other form of
5 Ward, Elizabeth H. "Practical Experience in Financing the Redevelopment of Contaminated Properties,"
Article prepared for forthcoming book Risk-Based Decision-Making Influencing Financial Transactions
and Brownfields Developments. (Alexandria, Virginia: RTM Communications, Inc.).
6 Pirok, Kenneth R. Commercial Loan Analysis: Principles and Techniques for Credit Analysts and
Lenders. (Chicago, Illinois: Probus Publishing Co., 1994), p. 44.
coverage is called "stop-loss" or "cost cap" insurance. This type of policy pays for any
remediation cost overruns above the value of collateral.
The value of insurance is that it protects the credit worthiness of the borrower
and provides greater certainty for the lending institution.7 It also secures the value of
the collateral. The disadvantage of insurance is that the lack of good actuarial data
tends to increase premiums and provide for inadequate coverage.8 In addition,
insurance companies require more environmental investigation before issuing a policy
which adds to the cost of the project in terms of both money and time.
The final major structuring components to these loans are escrows and
holdbacks. Escrows are financial instruments that the lender uses to cover the costs of
remediation. The borrower essentially deposits into an account cash, securities or a
letter of credit equal in value to the estimated cost of remediation. For an escrow to be
effective, remediation estimates have to be reasonably accurate and should also be
sufficient to cover interest payments until discharged. Escrow releases are triggered by
regulatory agency action and review of documentation for the remediation of the
contamination. Government agencies are notorious for slow moving approvals and
releases. Thus, escrows can be held up for years after the clean up has been
completed. Because of all the legal issues involved in remediation and related
government involvement, the use of escrow accounts involves expert counsel.
7 Moylan, Janet D. and Charles L Perry, Jr. "Environmental Insurance: A Critical Business Tool," The
Bankers Magazine, vol. 179, no. 4, July/August 1996, p. 38.
Lawrence, Robert F. "Insuring Environmental Risk: New Options, Opportunities," Envires EPA Shadow
Law Internet site.
Loan Administration
Over the life of the loan there is a rather wide difference of loan administration
practices after the loan is disbursed. If the payments are made timely and there are no
"red flags", the attentiveness in monitoring tends to drop off considerably after the first
few years. Recognizing that their CERCLA liabilities remain constant, the best of the
large banking organizations apply rigorous, on-going monitoring systems during the
entire life of the loan using a tiered system based on the loan size and level of risk.
Those properties or borrowers in the high-risk tier are reviewed annually for compliance.
Those in the medium-risk level are inspected every two or three years while low-risk
loans are reviewed on a three-or-more year rotation. All lending institutions perform
environmental due diligence assessments upon loan renewals, renegotiations or
refinancing, and for workouts or foreclosure.
Approaches for Evaluating Risks That Impair Use or Function
Loan Origination
Lenders seek to anticipate the risk of future restrictions on the use of a property
during the loan origination process by looking at the exposure inherent in the borrower's
business and his past operating history.
Due diligence on a borrower includes examination of a borrower's history of
compliance with regulations governing the use of property and compliance with
environmental regulations concerning the handling of hazardous substances and waste
disposal. Compliance audits of an environmentally harmful business document its
history of exposure to and compliance with all applicable environmental laws. They also
reveal where past mismanagement of chemicals and/or chemical-processing operations
could lead to future contamination or environmental liability.
Related to compliance audits is a review of past emissions and hazardous waste
permits. The maximum volume of waste allowable and the legal consequences for non-
compliance have a lot to do with environmental risk. Past activities can be a leading
indication of the extent to which regulatory trends in environmental use and restrictions
might impose limitations on a borrower's operations in the future. These limitations
might impair the use of the property and therefore its collateral value.
As a matter of practice, most lending institutions review environmental
management history. When making loans on large public works, or especially large
projects, the nationally chartered banking organizations use World Bank Criteria or ISO
14000 standards to assess the borrower's management capacity. The ISO 14000
system certifies that companies have established effective environmental management
procedures.
Loan Structuring and Pricing
If a borrower engages in an industry that utilizes or produces potentially
hazardous substances as part of its operations, a lender may employ similar
conservative underwriting strategies as it does with contaminated collateral. That is,
lenders would use lower loan-to-value and debt service coverage ratios as well as more
stringent underwriting conditions.
The large and middle-sized banks sometimes employ creative underwriting
techniques which separate asset value from the environmental liability. Ground leases
and sale-leaseback ownership structures transfer the ownership of the contaminated
property to a third party so that the cash flows from operations or manufacturing are
independent of the liability. Another strategy is to include in the collateral non-real
estate assets (e.g. inventories or manufacturing equipment) or unrelated, unattached
properties. Lenders should be aware, however, that under CERCLA, the federal
government can attach all of the borrower's assets and properties with a Superlien.
Loan Administration
Under current regulations, lenders can require borrowers to comply with
environmental laws. 9 Many banking organizations hold their debtors to these laws and
will initiate foreclosure on non-compliant borrowers as a violation of loan covenants.
Because banking organizations can conduct their own inspections and police borrower
activity, compliance issues can be detected early. Immediate response to potential
problems can prevent or limit the damage to the collateral value and the lender's
exposure to environmental liability.
In addition to monitoring the borrower during the life of the loan, environmental
risk managers and loan officers keep track of legislative developments and regulatory
activity as they pertain to environmental liability. Most of the ERM's have observed that
the current climate for environmental liability is increasingly favorable to lenders. In
some regions of the country, including New England, many state environmental
agencies have demonstrated support of brownfield remediation. These agencies have
initiated development programs to facilitate the financing of environmentally responsible
9 Brown, Johnine J. "Progress in Reducing Lender Liability Under Environmental Law," The Bankers
Magazine, vol. 179, no. 4, July/August 1996, p. 31.
projects. These ERM's have also noticed that the West Coast and Mid-West regions
still enforce relatively strict lender liability laws and remediation requirements.
In addition to several state and local redevelopment initiatives, there have been
some changes in how the national Superfund laws are interpreted in relation to lender
activity. Since 1992, when the Lender Liability Rule was first promulgated, more recent
court decisions have relaxed former interpretations of lender liability. Today, banking
organizations are allowed to remediate, hold, and prepare foreclosed properties for sale
without environmental liability provided that the banks divest the contaminated
properties at the earliest possible time and on commercially favorable terms.10 A few of
the banking organizations in this study have re-written their environmental risk
management policies to incorporate these developments.
Approaches to Evaluating Consumer Preference Risk
All of the banks interviewed for this thesis stated that their banking organization
does not have formal policies or specific methods that address consumers'
environmental concerns on the demand for the borrower's products or services and
consequently, on his or her credit worthiness. In fact, loan officers and environmental
risk managers do not even consider the adverse effects that environmental activism
may have on a borrower's reputation or business activity." Consumer boycotts and
negative public sentiment in response to an environmental transgression are too remote
to be of ongoing concern to loan officers.
0 Levine, Paul. "Knowing When & How to Lend on Contaminated Properties," Lecture for Environmental
Bankers Association, 5 May 1998.We have not considered in consumer preference risk the direct objection of local residents of an
objectionable use of a property. Such opposition is likely to suspend loan origination.
A lending institution is disposed to grant a loan to a borrower provided that it is a
legal business or entity and its credit worthiness is in line with the bank's risk thresholds.
Banking organizations and loan officers can and presumably do make "ethical" lending
decisions with environmental overtones. However, such considerations go beyond the
obligations of prudent lending. Besides, pressures on loan officers to approve
potentially profitable loans tend to offset such speculative concerns.
Findings and Conclusions
Financial and banking trade journals encourage lending institutions to make
informed loans when environmental risk is a factor and not to shun a potentially
profitable loan based solely on environmental risk. Most banking organizations share
this view and conduct their environmental assessment activities by emphasizing lending
policies based on the FDIC environmental guidelines. These lending policies focus on
the value and integrity of the real property to provide protective collateral while, under
the prospect of foreclosure, protect the bank from having to abandon its claim on the
collateral in order to avoid exorbitant remediation and liability costs.
Regarding loan pricing and structuring, loans with environmental risks are more
conservatively underwritten than loans without such risk. Lending institutions consider
environmental risks to be credit risks that could affect both the cash flows and collateral
value. This viewpoint is consistent with the FDIC and Federal Reserve Board
environmental guidelines that consider and treat environmental liability as a form of
credit risk. While environmentally risky loans typically have lower loan-to-value and
debt service coverage ratios, they are priced similarly to "clean" loans. Loans with
environmental issues include specific and stringent stipulations and conditions that
address the property's unique problems. Indemnities, hold harmless clauses, and
requirements to comply with all applicable environmental laws are written into the loan
agreement.
The protective covenants that can trigger a condition of default provide useful
leverage for the lender to initiate early corrective action by the borrower. As a practical
matter, environmental risk is not priced into the loan is because the magnitude of the
potential liability far exceeds the value of collateral and the adverse impact on loan
profitability is wildly uncertain. Even if quantifiable, increased interest rates or extra
points up front would neither be competitive nor able to cover losses in extreme cases
of remediation, loan default, or outright condemnation of the property. Therefore,
lending institutions do not have a strategy for differential loan pricing when underwriting
loans with environmental factors.
Environmental Risk Management departments establish environmental policies
to facilitate prudent loan underwriting. Though they establish the policies and
procedures for assessing risk, they do not decide whether to approve individual loans.
In reviewing applications, ERM's in this study consider primarily the environmental
liability in case of foreclosure and the regulatory risks on the borrower's cash flows.
Environmental risk managers may play a significant advisory role in a specific loan
situation if the inherent liability issues are large in relation to the collateral value, or if the
risk manager has a very different opinion of the viability loan from that of the credit
manager or loan officer.
Chapter 4:
Looking Forward
Overview
Owning real estate has often been described as owning a bundle of rights. No
one person or entity enjoys the whole bundle. Rather, to varying degrees for each
"stick" in the bundle, borrowers and lenders share the rights, responsibilities and
benefits associated with a given property. Under the law, moreover, third parties (and
"society") also have rights in the bundle when the property is used in a way that creates
adverse consequence from contamination or other conditions of use.
The presence of environmental issues can impinge dramatically on the rights of
borrower and lender. Under current environmental laws, federal agencies can step in
and retract most of the privileges of land ownership. The government can both demand
and enforce remediative action by attaching a Superlien onto the property or even onto
the borrower's other assets. In such an event, the borrower and lender's rights have
been preempted, at least until the environmental violation and consequent damages are
cured. The owner still owns the land, but he has no control over the property's
continued use and cash flows. Nor can the owner sell the property at will. Worse, both
the owner and the lender may be held responsible for large, open-ended clean up costs
for contamination they may not have caused.
Fear of such an unpleasant scenario has made lenders extremely cautious about
originating loans when environmental liability is associated with the collateral or with the
borrower's business activity. This uncertainty about the consequences of environmental
risk has caused lending activity to be curtailed and stifled investment and economic
development, particularly of brownfield properties, whose availability and desirability is
on the increase. Although recent interpretations of CERCLA and the Lender Liability
Rule have alleviated some lender fears, borrowers' exposure remains unabated.
Environmental problems, therefore, continue to generate circumstances for business
enterprises that disrupt operations, add costs, reduce liquidity and, consequently, create
potential losses for lending institutions. Hence, banking organizations continue to have
a vested interest in environmental issues and in promoting sustainable development
policies. As the attractiveness of brownfield development grows, banks face greater
potential involvement in environmental risk management.
This concluding chapter summarizes the findings of this research and, in its
Ways Forward section, discusses the paper's conclusions and recommendations. The
view developed by this paper is that sustainable development-incorporation of
environmental preservation and enhancement as an element of value, particularly for
brownfield properties:
" is likely to increase because of the growing economic potential of the affected
properties;
e is the best way to both realize the value of these properties and to manage the
environmental risk for lenders; and
" can be influenced in positive ways by lender practices both in the granting and
administration of real estate loans.
As a given, any environmental management policy must satisfy a lending
institution's need to be profitable.' For a forward thinking lender, the establishment of a
positive, sustainable development policy must be coordinated with rigorous financial
1 Robb, p.103.
analysis and prudent lending practices. Such lending practices must demonstrate that
financing brownfields or clean technologies make sense not only from an ecological
point of view, but more fundamentally, from an economic perspective. Prospectively, the
payoffs to these lenders are larger portfolios of more performing loans with higher
collateral values.
Banking organizations can promote sustainable development by encouraging
borrowers to integrate environmental considerations into their core business activities
and to establish corporate environmental management policies.2 Better management
of environmental risk in the private sector could, as a societal benefit, reduce the need
for government intervention and regulation. Free-market solutions usually allow for
more efficient allocations of capital than government appropriations and restrictions.
Environmentally progressive lending practices, particularly in regional banks or local
branch operations, can also give banks a competitive edge over "Wall Street banks",
pension funds, and insurance companies, which employ even more environmentally
restrictive lending practices than traditional banking organizations. Banks can also add
to their profits by reducing losses resulting from environmental liability. A recent survey
of German real estate lenders indicated that approximately 3% of their loan losses are
due to environmental risk and liability factors which, under German law, are comparable
to lender liability under United States law.3
2 Schmidheiny, p. 116.
3 Weber, 0. and Scholz, R.W. "Okologie und Umweltrisken in Sparkassen und Landesbanken",
Sparkasse, Vol. 8, 1996, pp. 372-373.
Ways Forward
As potential promoters of sustainable development, the lending industry can
have a pivotal influence. Almost every business and real estate developer has some
sort of debt in its capital structure. Thus, lending institutions, working together could
have the leverage to drive standards for real estate lending that could promote
sustainable development on a broad scale. The rest of this section offers suggestions
as to how banking organizations can both promote sustainability and improve their own
environmental risk management programs. This discussion will follow the loan
processing model of Loan Origination, Loan Structuring and Pricing, and Loan
Administration that the thesis proposed in Chapter 1.
Loan Origination
The loan origination process provides the first opportunity, in a transaction
context, for the lending industry to support sustainability; lenders can standardize credit
and environmental reviews around key elements that will facilitate sustainable
development lending. Although the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board have issued
general environmental guidelines to provide for flexibility among and within institutions,
implementation by lenders requires that they take certain specific actions and
processes.
The most significant need is for lenders to share and to standardize the use of
environmental risk-related information. Standardization in the use of this information
would facilitate coordination among the various federal and state agencies, lenders'
environmental management departments and borrowers. It would also improve the
quality of and reduce the uncertainty of environmental risk assessments and promote
the adoption of common assessment standards among Licensed Site Professionals.
Perhaps in the future such standardization might also help qualify these loans for
securitization.
It should be recognized that, as barriers to achieving these goals, there are major
deficiencies in the availability, consistency and quality of environmental data. These
data deficiencies reflect the diverse and fragmented legal and business framework that
has governed real estate ownership and use in the United States. Sources of data
regarding different environmental attributes (often not explicitly identified as such) of
individual properties include the federal government, state environmental protection
agencies, title companies, local real estate tax departments, building departments,
property and casualty insurance companies and lenders. The organization, format and
content of the records kept by these myriad entities are highly idiosyncratic.
Notwithstanding this lack of standardization of environmental data, greater
standardization of process remains a worthwhile goal.
The second practice recommendation that lenders should incorporate into their
environmental risk programs is the requirement that each borrower establish corporate
environmental policy statements and that lenders periodically assess the borrower's
performance against its own policies
The final recommendation in support of improved loan origination is that lending
institutions should improve the environmental training of their loan officers, credit
officers and loan administrators. The largest banks should have dedicated
environmental risk management staff with a wide range of expertise that covers all the
complex issues involved in evaluating and underwriting loans with environmental
concerns. 4  Compensation, career path and other career rewards should also be
aligned with each institution's business and loan policy objectives as they relate to the
management of environmental risk.
Loan Structuring and Pricing
Currently, banks use relatively straightforward, asset-based credit risk evaluation
methods when structuring and pricing loans. These techniques, which incorporate
traditional loan-to-value, loan coverage and other financial ratio analyses, do not
specifically address risks associated with environmental liability. As discussed
previously, variations in loan pricing to differentiate environmental risk do not have
sufficient capacity to compensate a lender adequately over an uncertain range of
economic outcomes. Consequently, banks need to reconsider how to adapt loan
structuring techniques to reduce their exposure on riskier projects. In the opinion of this
paper, lenders seeking to further sustainable development, including brownfield
properties, should look to:
" the use of land leases to separate out soil-related contamination issues from those
(like asbestos) that may be associated with the building structure or fixtures;
* the availability of publicly subsidized and guaranteed financing options, particularly
in inner city and blighted industrial areas where redevelopment is sought as a matter
of public policy. Both the Small Business Administration and the Department of
4 Henry, Evan C. and Muller, Randy A. "Private Sector Financing Considerations for Brownfields," Bank of
America Internet site, 0 1996.
Housing and Urban Development have grant and loan guarantee programs for such
properties.5
* restructuring collateral in the cases where subsequent contamination is found or
restrictions on use arise. The same land lease techniques to structure a transaction
before closing can be employed for the property loan-in-being.
" implementing risk-based clean up standards which make remediation costs more
predictable more and affordable. Increased certainty provides value to banks, which
will enable them to create competitive pricing strategies.6
" providing in advance for the substitution or enhancement of collateral in the event
that adverse environmental event lowers the value of the original collateral below
some designated threshold. Although such a contingency provision could encumber
other property of the borrower, it could be preferable than more equity.
Beyond the power of lenders, but material to their interest, are the current IRS
provisions regarding the tax deductibility of the cost of environmental remediation and
hazardous material abatement. The relevant sections of Internal Revenue Code,
revenue rulings and advisory letters are ambiguous, confusing, and conflicting in the tax
treatment of these costs. A reasonable summary of these provisions is as follows:
* in general, the cost of removing contaminants from a structure, especially if part of a
larger construction project, is a capital expense, to be deducted ratably over the tax
life of the project;
e encapsulation of (as opposed to removal of) contaminants within a structure is an
immediately deductible expense;
* however, under Section 198 of the revised code, enacted in 1996, there is a window
from the years 1997 through 2000 during which both removal and encapsulation of
contaminants in a structure are immediately deductible; and
* as provided in Revenue Ruling 9438, the removal of in-the-ground contaminants is
immediately deductible.
5 Telego, Dean Jeffery. "Financing the Reuse of Contaminated Commercial and Industrial Sites,"
Presented to Conference on Risk-Based Decision-Making in Successful Financial Transactions and
Brownfield Redevelopment, Washington DC, April 1998.
6 Brown, p. 32.
Immediate deductibility, of course, is better for borrowers (and also lenders) because of
its favorable effect on cash flow.7
Lenders should use their influence to obtain more consistent and permanent
favorable tax treatment for all remediation costs. In such an event, loan structures
could be revised to reflect the improved cash flow and reduced collateral impact when
properties are affected by the presence of environmental contaminants.
Loan Administration
Loans with environmental risks, once booked, should receive diligent oversight
throughout the term of the loan. Even after the loan has been substantially paid down,
potential Superfund liabilities for lenders do not diminish along with the unpaid loan
balance. The environmental scrutiny of the initial due diligence phase should continue
throughout the life of the loan. The reality, however, is that once a lending institution
makes a loan, it is not legally required to seek out any environmental liability afterwards.
Nor does the Prudent Man Rule necessarily apply to ongoing environmental risk
monitoring. There are, however, adverse financial consequences if a problem, long
undetected or ignored, is discovered after having grown in magnitude over time. Like
cancer, environmental contamination is best detected and treated early.
Once a problem is discovered, the bank should work with the borrower and
environmental agencies to correct the problem and reduce the financial risk to all.
Interview with Thomas K. O'Brien, CPA, who researched the relevant provisions of the tax code and rulings
summarized here.
Conclusion and Summary
The hypotheses stated at the beginning of this paper regarding bank lending
practices on properties, especially brownfield properties, having elements of
environmental risk were that:
" lenders focus on contamination as a threat to collateral value. There is a much
lower level of concern over impaired future use and negative consumer response
against a borrower with a poor environmental record;
" lenders categorically avoid such properties. Such wariness is as much a function of
perceived exposure to adverse financial consequences as exposure to lawsuits and
citations by environmental regulators; and
" although loan structuring methodologies serve to partially mitigate environmental
risk, loans are not priced in relation to their environmental risk exposure. Rather,
the potential magnitude and uncertainty of such exposure is beyond the range of
pricing latitude that lenders practically have in a competitive market.
The research has largely supported these hypotheses. At the same time, the findings
of this paper point to the opportunity to lenders of meeting borrowers' and community
needs for supporting the development of brownfields projects, which in large part are
dependent on the availability of mortgage financing.
Lenders in all size categories have certain competencies and resources that can
support their being more aggressive in making such loans. Smaller institutions have
the advantage of local knowledge. Larger institutions have the scale to maintain
environmental risk management departments that can develop practices and training
programs to ensure effective lender management of environmental risk. And all
lenders could avail themselves, their borrowers and their communities of loan subsidy
and guarantee programs designed to promote brownfields developments in
communities that could benefit from them.
To participate successfully in this market lenders have to focus on the way they
approach environmental risk management throughout to loan cycle. Origination
practices need better environmental risk information and more standardized treatment
of environmental risk factors by better trained loan officers in screening and qualifying
loan and borrowers. Borrowers need to be encouraged by lenders to develop and
practice sound, sustainable development practices for the properties they own and
manage. Structuring practices could also benefit from new creative approaches to
buttress the collateralization of loans both at their outset and if values become
jeopardized by subsequent events. While loans are outstanding, lender oversight of
borrowers' environmental management policies and practices should be as integral to
ongoing administration as review of property financial performance.
To be sure, there are external barriers that must be overcome. Poor reliability,
usefulness and quality of environmental data on properties are problems long in the
making and not easily remedied. Complex tax provisions that discourage and deter the
redevelopment of environmentally impaired properties need to be addressed.
Despite the constraints, the real estate market is directing more and more
development activity to properties with negative environmental histories. The primary
drivers for increased activity in these properties are the shrinking availability of
undeveloped land in good locations and public policy initiatives to redevelop blighted
properties. Taken together, these forces will increasingly shape the future for lenders
and the borrowers whose needs they serve.
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